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 Organized Resistance, Terrorism,
 and Criminality in Ireland:
 The State's Construction
 of the Control Equation
 Mark Findlay
 Introduction
 Despite the reality of partition that created "two Irelands," comparative
 analysis of the state's reactions to terrorism in the Province and in the
 Republic is rare. The struggle over reunification, which permeates
 society on both sides of the border, is usually viewed by the populist press not
 from the Irish viewpoint, but rather from the perspective of the British govern?
 ment. Given this bias, organized resistance?most notably in the North of
 Ireland?is represented as an assault on a majority-supported state. Because
 the legitimacy of the state under attack is rarely questioned, and the motiva?
 tions for the resistance are over-simplified and misrepresented, the state's
 reaction to such terrorism escapes criticism, except in the most obvious
 instances.
 By reducing opposition organized against the partition of Ireland to the par?
 ticular conflict between certain paramilitary groups in the North and the
 British government, the broad social and political bases of the struggle are
 overlooked. Only if the centuries-long involvement of Britain in Irish affairs
 is appreciated1 does the social inequality which exists in the Province gain its
 true significance. It is in this context that we must analyze the current turmoil
 in Ireland. The opposing paramilitary factions are not bound together by
 religious dogma, and their intransigence is not grounded in religious dif?
 ferences alone, although these certainly play a part. Religion has stood
 historically in Ireland as a social identifier (similar to the role of race and
 "color" in the U.S.). The lines of the conflict may appear to be rooted in
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 religious divisions, but the essence of the struggle lies in the great social,
 economic, and political discrepancies which have existed between these
 groups ever since the British intervention into Ireland.2
 Even more important to a balanced understanding of Irish paramilitary
 activity and the terrorism which emanates from it is a close examination of
 government efforts in the Republic and the Province to shore up their own
 legitimacy through repression of organized resistance to the partition. This
 article considers the ways in which the criminal sanction comes to be contorted
 by the counterinsurgency strategies of both states against paramilitary
 organizations which may command significant popular support. In so doing,
 I wish to touch on certain organizational hybrids which have been created to
 facilitate the "administration of criminal justice" in both states.
 Struggle for Ideology
 Before discussing any struggle between organized popular resistance
 groups and the Irish states, it is essential to appreciate the levels on which the
 struggle is waged. The press, we must keep in mind, concentrates on the func?
 tional features of the struggle (e.g., bombings, military intervention, intern?
 ment, "hunger strikes," etc.), while avoiding the realization that the origins
 of such action are found in issues of ideology.
 At the outset, there are definitional questions essential to a particular
 representation of the conflict, which obtain their meaning from the ideological
 base of the defining party. An example of this is the terrorist act itself. Prior
 to the cessation of internment in the North, the British government would have
 viewed the bombing of a public building in Belfast as an act of terrorism. Ter?
 rorism in this sense was seen as a violent assault on the "legitimate" govern?
 ment of the state. At that time, the British government did not choose to view
 a terrorist act as the manifestation of mindless anarchy. Through the nature
 of its response?the use of internment without trial and army operations for
 civil/social control?the government of the United Kingdom (U.K.) also
 implicitly accepted the "war model" motivation of the paramilitary forces.
 After the policy shift in 1974 by the U.K. government (with the Labor
 Party in power), and the cessation of internment, the definition of the same
 terrorist act assumed different proportions. The government, then and now,
 has simply redefined all paramilitary violence as acts of criminality. Although
 the "legal" measures developed to counter such activity may appear to con?
 tradict this stance, the terrorists' acts are denied their political nature and are
 defined as common crime. Gradually this definition has been altered to the
 point that the character of this criminal behavior, in its peculiar degree of
 threat to the state at least, has been accepted as unique.
 The paramilitaries, the authors of the terrorist act, conceive of it in terms
 of a war ideology. It is a means chosen to advance their cause, yet the motiva?
 tion for their actions, and the sociopolitical environment within which they are
 committed, make the "criminal label" both simplistic and misleading. As acts
 of war against what they perceive to be an imposed and illegitimate
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 government, the resort to terrorist tactics is itself legitimized both for the
 actors and their supporters.
 This example of "terrorism" makes clear how patterns of definition
 depend on the ideology from which they emerge. Nevertheless, the impor?
 tance of ideology to the dynamics of the conflict extends far beyond the realm
 of definitions. As argued below, once it is accepted that it is the legitimacy
 of both Irish states which is under attack, then the ultimate goal comes into
 focus: the establishment of a new version of the legitimate and united Ireland,
 based on a fundamentally different ideology, as well as a transformation of
 ideologies.
 The Crisis of Legitimacy
 Since the creation of the Irish Free State and the partition of the North, all
 governments in Ireland have faced fundamental and often violent challenges
 to their legitimacy. Both the nature and perception of these challenges have
 altered over time. In the early days of De Valera's government, the then
 Taoiseach (Prime Minister) accepted the war model of his one-time com?
 patriots, the IRA, and proceeded to eradicate the vestiges of Republican
 resistance by military force. This led to years of civil war.
 As mentioned earlier, the British government has also flirted with the' 'war
 model" response to challenges to its legitimacy. The governments of the
 Republic and the Province have countered such challenges through a reliance
 on the so-often unquestioned ideology of the rule of law. Reliance on a legal
 response to a challenge to the legitimacy of the state did not simply arise out
 of the failure of military intervention. In some respects, the exercise of the
 criminal sanction seems no more effective in controlling terrorism than was
 military intervention. However, it is not simply in terms of its deterrent influ?
 ence that reliance on social control through the agencies of the law is now
 preferred. It is believed that the state, through a commitment to legal sanc?
 tions, will reinforce its legitimacy by associating its overt policies with the
 law, rather than with a less acceptable commitment to force.
 Even those who criticize the ideology of the rule of law usually limit those
 criticisms to the methods (as well as the reality) of its application. E.P.
 Thompson (1977:262), for example, expresses confidence in the protective
 potential of the rule of law. He does so while at the same time remaining
 suspect of its ' 'pliant and instrumental functions.'' However, when these often
 questionable functions are justified by an ideology which itself bears little rela?
 tion to any of its manifestations, the critique must move into the realm of
 ideology. This is particularly necessary when this ideology is not only used
 to sanitize the application of the criminal sanction to politically marginal
 behavior, but also, by implication, to legitimize the state which relies on it.
 Considering the importance of the rule of law to both sides in this
 legitimacy crisis, it is not difficult to understand the growing trend of govern?
 ments and their enemies to adopt the language of ideology. However, this is
 done without assuming the minimal obligation of attempting to translate this
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 language into practice. Indeed, when we examine the mutations of criminal
 justice which have been developed as a part of Irish criminal law, it becomes
 apparent that the relevance of certain essential features of the ideology is
 actually denied.
 The rule of law as applied through the criminal sanction to the control of
 organized resistance has two main intentions. First and most obvious is its
 functional objectives. The second is to gain authority through a claim over
 ideology. Yet as Habermas (1976:10) warns, this is not enough to ensure any
 lasting claim to legitimacy.
 This means that the technical legal form alone, pure legality, will not
 be able to guarantee recognition in the long run, if the system of
 authority cannot be legitimated independently of the legal form of
 existing authority.... Moreover the organisations which are respon?
 sible for making and applying the law are in no way legitimated by
 the legality of the modes of procedure (or vice versa) but likewise by
 general interpretation which supports the system of authority as a
 whole (emphasis added).
 Even where the criminal sanction is put to new uses and imposed in a
 unique manner, continual failure to fulfill the material claims to the ideology
 of justice will mean its legitimacy cannot stand on the formality of the process
 alone. The institutional conditions created by the state to administer this "new
 justice" through "new" means will not be justified simply by their legality.
 This masking function, therefore, carries with it certain risks for the
 legitimation crisis. These risks relate to the antecedent challenge to the
 ideology itself, where the division between reality and rhetoric becomes bla?
 tant. The more obviously divorced the ideology is from its various manifesta?
 tions, the weaker is its masking function, due to the strain on the ideology
 itself.
 However, the potency of the rule of law as it influences the control of
 political violence in Ireland remains resilient. It seems difficult to deny such
 a self-contained ideology as the rule of law, when even anachronistic images
 of it (such as the jury) seem to escape criticism at the level of ideology.3 It is
 not the structure of the system of authority based on the rule of law, its legality,
 or its public acceptance alone which reinforces the legitimacy of the
 ideological base. Rather, it is the fact that concepts of justice have for so long
 relied on ideology for their definition in the community that the ideology has
 taken on an almost mystical significance.
 It is this potential for mystification that is the second reason both parties
 to the challenge would wish to represent their respective actions and reactions
 as just and equitable. In this sense there is a struggle to lay best claim to the
 same ideology. For example, the paramilitaries in the North deny the justice,
 relevance, and even authenticity of the absolute claim to any exercise of the
 rule of law through the British courts. While the agencies of the criminal law
 attempt to "delegitimize" the motives of the paramilitaries by labeling their
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 actions as criminal, the would-be "criminals" deny the state's power to make
 any such determination and attack the institutions charged with implementing
 the criminal label. In addition, those responsible for organized resistance pre?
 sent the contrary definition of their terrorism to that section of the community
 from whence they draw their general support. Their success in gaining accep?
 tance for their definition of the struggle (the violence of material conditions
 and counterviolence, state terrorism and the adoption of terrorist tactics) will
 depend on the success or failure of the state's efforts to undermine the alliance
 between these groups and their community.
 With the prize of community consensus and support goes the potential to
 mystify the motives and purposes of particular actions. If the community con?
 cedes that the terrorists are little more than criminals, then the state can
 depoliticize the conflict. If the state is able to undermine the motives of
 organized resistance for a significant period of time, it may even influence the
 manner in which the terrorists perceive and represent their actions.
 Once the opposition has been delegitimized, the state can then invest its
 own reactions to violent resistance with some sense of ideological purity. The
 rule of law, so claimed, can further legitimize and mystify the state's original
 position under the challenge, to the extent that the rationales and reason
 underlying the conflict, and even the limits of the conflict itself, become
 clouded and confused. This works to the advantage of the state: once any sec?
 tion of the community loses its understanding of ultimate goals, of what is
 being contested, then support for one particular side of the struggle (or opposi?
 tion to the other) seems less tenable.
 Therefore, in the context of the struggle for legitimacy in Ireland, the state
 in particular will use the ideology of the rule of law not solely to mask ulterior
 injustice, but further to mystify and confuse the reality of injustice, partiality,
 and selectivity in the eyes of the community. The situation becomes further
 obfuscated, as the opposite to the rule of law is institutionalized through new
 processes of criminal justice. In addition, the state does not choose to
 substitute the law for the exercise of force. Force and law are recognized as
 complementary for social control.
 Where ideology counts for little more than as a device for legitimacy, the
 formal legal rules and procedures cannot provide what Thompson (1977:267)
 terms ' 'a medium within which other social conflicts (can be) fought out.'' The
 Irish examples referred to earlier do not merely reveal the perpetual truth of
 the law: that it falls so far short of its rhetoric. They expose the manipulation
 of ideology in a situation of political repression. The state sees no need to
 dispense with the rule of law in order to defeat the challenges to its hegemony.
 The Criminal Sanction and the Rule of Law
 as Applied to Organized Resistance
 Perhaps because of the clear distinction between the reality and the rhetoric
 of the rule of law as evidenced through the developments in Irish criminal
 justice over the last decade, it is not difficult to represent the criminal law as
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 masking and mystifying4 the political reality of organized resistance. Yet it is
 not enough to see the process of criminalization as some simple dichotomy
 between the ideology of the rule of law and the practice of criminal justice.5
 Here we are not talking about excesses of judicial or executive discretion
 within the system of criminal justice. Nor are we faced with a conflict between
 arbitrary extra-legal power and the rule of law. Rather we are faced with
 audacious states which seem committed to institutionalizing open contradic?
 tions between the function and ideology of the criminal sanction. Yet, because
 of this obvious hypocrisy, it may not follow that since this process of institu
 tionalization was a necessity, ideology could turn necessity into advantage.
 As Thompson (1977:263) concedes:
 The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law in its function
 as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross
 manipulation, and shall seem to be just.
 McBarnett (1981) sees the analysis of law and ideology as far more fun?
 damental than exposing and tracing the emergence of dichotomies. She states
 that many of these dichotomies may even be false. Accepting this, one needs
 to examine the nature and the role of the law itself, whether it be as written
 or administered.
 The vague notion of' 'due process" or4 'the law in books'' in fact col?
 lapses two quite distinct aspects of law into one; the general principles
 around which the law is discussed?the rhetoric of justice?and the
 actual procedures and rules by which justice or legality are opera
 tionalised. The rhetoric used when justice is discussed resounds with
 high sounding principles, but does the law incorporate the rhetoric?
 Once it is accepted that this cannot be merely assumed, it is the law itself
 and not simply the people who operate it which requires analysis. When exam?
 ining the nature and role of the law itself, one is not so much interested in
 individual deviations from the ideology through the exercise of discretion. Nor
 is the focus of concern on what law enforcers should do and what the law
 should achieve. Rather, one will concentrate on issues concerned with "the
 politics of criminal justice," and not so much its operation.
 Fairness and efficiency would not naturally result if the dichotomy between
 practice and existing law could be resolved. In the following series of exam?
 ples I intend to illustrate how the Irish experience accords with McBarnett's
 conclusion that the law itself does not conform to the ideology of legality:
 . .. that in its substantive and procedural content it positively con?
 tradicts the precepts of due process and that consequently there is no
 fundamental conflict between the formal system of law and the infor?
 mal practices of agencies such as the police and the courts (1978).
 The recent legislative changes in Ireland, concerned with the application
 of the criminal sanction to politically marginal violence, positively confer and
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 affirm certain practices which are in direct conflict with the central tenets of
 the rule of law. They are not, as authors like Skolnick (1966) represent, devia?
 tions from the rule of law, abuses, or informal accommodations to the conflict?
 ing demands of law enforcement. Deviation from legality is institutionalized
 in the law itself.
 Criminalizing Organized Resistance
 The rule of law, due process of law, or formal rationality,. . .sets
 (sic) definite constraints on the ability of political elites to dispose
 efficiently of collective violence, constraints which they can ignore
 only at the risk of endangering that long-run legitimacy and interest
 in surveying revolutionary potential. On the other hand, the
 immediate pressure to end the violence unavoidably dictates the
 serious abrogations of the principle of formal rationality and hence
 precisely the risk of delegitimation and maximisation of revolu?
 tionary potential (Balbus, 1973:3).
 By detailing examples of where such "abrogations" have developed, in
 both Irish jurisdictions, I hope to indicate the reliance placed by both states
 on an altered notion of the law, developed specifically for politically marginal
 challenges to the states' legitimacy. These examples will be broadly dealt with
 in the chronological order in which they may have influenced the administra?
 tion of the criminal sanction.
 Detention and Interrogation
 In the North of Ireland the present strategy for the investigation and pro?
 secution of terrorist offenses is based on the Report of the Commission of
 Enquiry under Lord Diplock (1972). The Commission's recommendations,
 both in relation to police powers and to the trial process, were extensive and
 involved radical departures from the ordinary criminal justice system
 operating throughout the Province at that time. Briefly, the report recom?
 mended that the Royal Ulster Constabulary and members of the armed forces
 should have power to arrest, without warrant, any person suspected of
 involvement in, or-having information about, terrorist offenses, and to detain
 him for up to four hours for identification purposes. It is not necessary that
 the suspect be informed of the reasons for his arrest. The Commission also
 recommended that it be an offense to refuse to answer, or to give a false or
 misleading answer to, any arresting officer. Such powers already existed in
 a similar form in the Republic.6
 These recommendations were broadly followed in the Emergency Provi?
 sions (Northern Ireland) Act, 1973. The Act also provided the police with the
 power to arrest any person suspected of being a terrorist, and the right to detain
 him for up to 72 hours.
 These arrest and detention powers, originally recommended by Diplock,
 were extended in the wake of the "Birmingham bombings." The Prevention
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Mon, 22 May 2017 01:41:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 102 Findlay
 of Terrorism Act, 1974, brought the provisions to apply throughout the whole
 of the United Kingdom. For the first time in peace-time history of Britain,
 statute law provided for arrest without warrant of anyone whom a policeman
 "reasonably suspects to be concerned with the commission, preparation or
 instigation of acts of terrorism.'' The Act provides for detention without arrest
 for up to 48 hours, but this may be extended, with the consent of the Secretary
 of State for Northern Ireland, for a period not exceeding five days.
 Prior to Diplock's report the governments of the Republic had invested the
 Garda Siochana (police) with wide discretion to detain and question suspected
 terrorists. Section 5, Subsection 1 of the Offenses Against the State (Amend?
 ment) Act, 1940, provided the police with powers to demand identifying infor?
 mation from detained persons and to search, photograph, and fingerprint these
 persons. Subsection 2 made any person who obstructed or impeded the exer?
 cise of these powers, or failed or refused to give such identifying information,
 guilty of a contravention of the regulations made under this part of the Act "in
 relation to the preservation of discipline."
 The 1972 amending Act developed this theme. (This Act is discussed in
 detail in the following section of the article.) The police powers to require
 information were widened. The interrogating officer need only have
 "reasonable grounds" for believing that a scheduled offense had been com?
 mitted in the vicinity, and that the person questioned knew of its commission,
 to justify questions as to identity and "recent movements." Failure or refusal
 to answer, or the provision of false or misleading information, would con?
 stitute an offense. Therefore, the police not only make discretionary decisions
 as to when such information could be required, but also what acts or omissions
 constitute an offense.
 The general offense referred to in Section 4 of the 1972 Act has the poten?
 tial to cover all facets of, and likely participants in, the criminal justice system.
 Due to the extensive ambit of "an interference with the course of justice"
 referred to in that section, the police and the prosecution have almost unlimited
 powers to charge and bring before the court anyone who acts in a manner
 which is "likely, directly or indirectly" to influence any individual associated
 with a civil or criminal matter before any court.
 Arrest and Charge?New Offenses
 In the Republic, Part III of the original Offenses Against the State Act,
 1939, defined and prohibited membership in "unlawful organisations" (Sec?
 tion 24). However, it was not sufficient merely to create such an offense, the
 features of which were broad and general (Section 18) and hence difficult to
 prosecute. Section 24 was the only provision in the Act which specifically
 referred to proof requirements for the offense. If the accused was found to be
 in possession of an "incriminating document," that would be sufficient
 evidence of his membership. The defense of mistake or ignorance as to the
 illegal nature of the organization was not available to the defendant.
 The 1972 Amendment substantially broadened the definition of what was
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 an illegal organization, and in so doing brought a large number of potential
 offenders within its scope. But this would be of little value to the state, unless
 the evidentiary and procedural difficulties involved in successfully pros?
 ecuting this offense were overcome. Evidence of such membership may come
 by inference or implication or be based on the "hearsay" statements of others.
 If an accused fails to deny such inference or implication, that omission may
 also act as evidence. The offense created under the 1939 Act is given effect
 through a reduction in the evidentiary requirements to establish the general
 features of the offense. Prior to the amendments enacted in 1972, it was a dif?
 ficult offense to prove, and as a result, the criminal law could not be relied
 on by the state to deter membership in the proscribed organizations. The
 following changes in the law reveal the state's commitment to using the
 criminal justice process to regulate this type of behavior even if this requires
 fundamental compromises in the process itself, rather than conceding that
 legal prohibitions may be neither appropriate nor effective to control political
 dissent.
 On November 26, 1972, a bomb exploded in a crowded cinema in Burgh
 Quay, Dublin, and as a result, 25 people were treated in hospitals for injuries
 they sustained. The text of the Offenses Against the State (Amendment) Act,
 1972, was published on the following day. On November 29, the Taoiseach
 (Prime Minister), Mr. Lynch, rejected a compromise version of the Act, sug?
 gested by the opposition party. A government defeat was likely on the issue
 and, therefore, a general election would be imminent. December 1 saw explo?
 sions in the center of Dublin that killed two people and injured over 120 others.
 When the Ddil (lower house of Parliament) was informed of the bombings,
 Fine Gael (the major opposition party) withdrew its opposition to the bill,
 allowing it to pass all stages with only 24 members of the house opposing it.
 On the evening of Sunday, December 3, the final stage of the bill was rushed
 through the Seanad (upper house of Parliament). The Act is brief, comprising
 only six sections, the first and last being standard provisions relating to the
 Act's title. Section 5 amends the definition of "document" as defined in Sec?
 tion 2 of the 1939 Act, to include maps, graphs, photographs, disks,
 microfilms, etc., and other devices reflecting the technical advances of the
 intervening years.
 It is Sections 2,3, and 4 that have given cause for alarm both on the grounds
 of the wide discretionary powers which they create and confer, and the rever?
 sal of the traditional onus of proof. Section 2 confers powers on the Garda
 (police) to question persons near to the place of the commission of a scheduled
 offense, if they have "reasonable grounds" for believing such an offense has
 been committed and that the person questioned knew of its commission. The
 officer can demand of the person "his name and address and an account of his
 recent movements and if the person fails, or refuses to give the information
 or gives information that is false or misleading, he shall be guilty of an
 offense...." (Section 40).
 Section 3 is perhaps the most criticized of the Act's provisions. It deals
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 with evidence of membership in an "unlawful organization" as defined in the
 original Act.
 Subsection 1 (a) is extremely broad in the net that it casts for actions which
 will comprise such evidence.
 Any statement made orally, in writing, or otherwise, or any conduct
 by an accused person, implying or leading to a reasonable inference
 that he was, at a material time a member of an unlawful organisation
 shall, in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act of 1939, be evidence
 that he was then such a member (emphasis added).
 In this subsection "conduct'' includes an omission by the accused person to
 deny published reports that he was a member of an unlawful organization, but
 the fact of such a denial shall not be conclusive.7 One of the most widely used
 methods of establishing the offense of being a member of an illegal organiza?
 tion before the Special Criminal Court is enunciated in Subsection 2 of Section
 3. Where it is the belief of a Garda (police) Chief Superintendent in giving
 evidence in proceedings relating to an offense under Section 21, that the
 accused was, at a material time, a member of an unlawful organization, the
 statement of such a belief shall be evidence that he was then such a member.
 As Professor Robinson (1974) stated when discussing the Special Criminal
 Courts:
 This action was strongly criticised in the debates in both the D?il and
 Senate and by commentators outside Leinster House. Various
 dangers were pointed out: in particular the fact that the way in which
 information is gathered by intelligence services in any country is open
 to error. To allow such information to be given the status of evidence
 and then to protect the witness from cross examination by allowing
 the Garda Superintendent to plead privilege?creates an extremely
 dangerous precedent which could undermine the democratic process.
 In effect this would not be a case of one man's word against another,
 but the case of a belief which was based on undivulged facts and
 derived from undivulged sources which could be at second or third
 hand, being set against another man's assertions.
 In this manner the judiciary is excluded from ruling on the acceptability
 or validity of the evidence presented to it. Not only is the defendant, in the
 Special Criminal Court, precluded from trial by jury, but in cases brought
 under Section 21, the Garda Superintendent can be seen as having been con?
 ferred with de facto judicial powers in that his beliefs concerning the accused's
 membership in an illegal organization must go unchallenged to the court as
 incontrovertible evidence. Not even the bench can refuse to accept it.
 Not only does Section 3 place the burden of proof squarely on the shoulders
 of the defense to deny the offense (the denial itself not conclusively discharg?
 ing this burden), but it also waives normal rules of evidence such as those
 governing 4 'hearsay,'' with respect to the beliefs of the Garda Superintendent.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Mon, 22 May 2017 01:41:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Ireland: Crime and Counterinsurgency 105
 Section 4 confers the widest discretion to charge persons with making
 statements or holding meetings, demonstrations, or processions that constitute
 4 4 an interference with the course of justice." Therefore, organized opposition
 to the implementation of this statute could be seen as contravening this section
 even were it to be orderly and peaceful. Any of the above-mentioned
 statements or organized actions will be deemed to constitute an interference
 with the course of justice:
 If it is intended, or of such a character as to be likely, directly or indi?
 rectly to influence any court, person or authority concerned with the
 institution, conduct or defense of any civil or criminal proceedings
 (including a party or witness) as to whether or not the proceedings
 should be instituted, conducted, continued or defended, or as to what
 should be their outcome (Section 4(1) (b)).
 It would be difficult to imagine how a more all-encompassing definition of
 such a vague notion as 4 4interference with the course of justice" could be
 drafted.
 One of the principal justifications for the amendment to the Offenses Against
 the State Act was that previous legislation was not sufficient to deal with the
 situation of political unrest and terrorist attack as it existed in 1972. But this
 statement is surely belied by the figures of 112 convictions and 47 acquittals for
 scheduled offenses before the Special Criminal Court between May 30 and
 December 31, 1972 (Robinson, Appendix 2, 1976:38). It would be optimistic
 indeed for the state to envisage a more favorable conviction rate for most other
 charges. The Special Criminal Court appeared to be dealing most severely with
 scheduled offenses prior to the provisions of the 1972 amendment.
 In its editorial Hibernia (Dec. 1, 1972: 3) made this criticism of the
 legislation:
 In his cleverly worded statement after the imposition of internment
 in Northern Ireland in August 1971, the Taoiseach said that 4'The
 introduction of internment without trial in the North, is deplorable
 evidence of the political poverty of the (Government's) policies."
 The proposed amendments to the Offenses Against the State Act are
 not just an instrument for employment against those who threaten the
 institution of the State. They represent a fundamental change in the
 law of the land.
 Changes in the Nature of Trial Courts
 Following Diplock's deliberations, radical changes in the mode and con?
 duct of the trial occurred in the Province. To overcome the possibility that
 witnesses would be intimidated, or that' 'perverse acquittals" might be handed
 down by partisan juries, or even that certain admissions or confessions would
 not be admitted at the trial due to evidentiary restrictions, a new court system
 was proposed. It was recommended that jury trial be suspended for a large
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 number of existing criminal offenses which would be scheduled. It was also
 recommended that the rules of evidence be altered so as to reverse the onus
 of proof for firearms charges, and to allow for the admissibility of all confes?
 sions unless obtained by torture or cruel and degrading treatment.8
 Almost all the recommendations of the Diplock Commission with respect
 to the new criminal court process could find counterparts already on the statute
 books in the Republic. The similarity is particularly marked when one com?
 pares the "Diplock Courts" in the North with the Special Criminal Court in
 Dublin. The latter is a non-jury court, which entertains less rigid rules of
 evidence and accepts a reversal of the onus of proof in certain circumstances.
 Perhaps the most obvious difference between these two institutions is that the
 Special Criminal Court presently sits with a bench of three judges, whereas
 its Northern counterpart is a single judge tribunal.
 Unlike any other judicial body in the Republic, the Special Criminal Court
 was specifically designed to deal with a particularly narrow category of
 scheduled offenses. Over the years, however, this restriction has to some
 extent been interpreted flexibly so that almost all major property crimes with
 violence (whether politically motivated or not) may be placed before the
 Special Criminal Court. In terms of the original concept of the court's interest,
 the behavior of the accused who are brought before it should possess some
 threat to the political existence of the state.
 On May 26, 1972, the government signed a proclamation under Part V of
 the Offenses Against the State Act, 1939, reconstituting Special Criminal
 Courts to deal with offenses scheduled under the Act. Section 35, Subsection
 2 identifies the conditions which will influence the government in its decision
 to publish such a proclamation:
 If or whenever or so often as the Government is satisfied that the ordi?
 nary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of
 justice and the preservation of public peace and order and that it is
 therefore necessary that this Part of this Act should come into force,
 the Government may make and publish a proclamation declaring that
 the Government is satisfied as aforesaid.
 No details were given by the government as to why or how it saw the exist?
 ing courts as being inadequate. Vague suggestions had been made in the Ddil
 about the intimidation of juries, but specific cases were not referred to. It was
 hoped that the existence of the Special Criminal Court would speed up pros?
 ecutions that were expected to increase with the government's stepped-up initi?
 atives against illegal organizations.
 Four days after the proclamation had been published, three judges were
 named to constitute the Court. This was a departure from previous special
 courts that had been exclusively made up of military personnel.
 Also on 30th May, the Government issued the First Order, schedul?
 ing the offenses already noted for the purpose of Part V, and in
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 November 1972 the Second Order was made adding to the list of
 offenses under Section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Prop?
 erty Act 1875. Meanwhile on 4th August 1972 the Government had
 made an Order increasing the membership of the Special Criminal
 Court to seven (Robinson, 1974: 26).
 The powers, jurisdiction, and procedures of the Special Criminal Court are
 examined in Part V of the 1939 Act. The most novel of these are as follows:
 1) Section 45 of the 1939 Act provides first that where a person is brought
 before a District Justice charged with a scheduled offense, and the offense is
 one which the justice has jurisdiction to dispose of summarily, the District
 Justice, if the Attorney General so requests, will send such a person to the
 Special Criminal Court for trial.
 If the person is brought before a District Justice on an indictable charge
 which is scheduled and the District Justice receives information in relation to
 it, then he must send such a person forward for trial to the Special Criminal
 Court unless the Attorney General directs otherwise.
 When the offense charged before the District Justice is not a scheduled one
 and the Attorney General wants it tried before the Special Criminal Court, he
 must certify in writing that the ordinary courts are, in his opinion, inadequate
 to secure the effective administration of justice and the preservation of a public
 peace and order in relation to the trial of such persons on such a charge (Sec?
 tion 46).
 The district court may be by-passed completely in relation to all offenses
 whether scheduled or not. Section 47 lays down the procedure through which
 this may be achieved. The accused may be charged before the Special Criminal
 Court, at the direction of the Attorney General, or warrants may be issued
 from this court for his arrest and retention in custody.
 2) Under Section 34 of the 1939 Act, a conviction by the Special Criminal
 Court on a scheduled offense will mean that where the defendant is a civil ser?
 vant, he will immediately forfeit his office, all pension and superannuation
 privileges, and be disqualified from holding public employment for seven
 years.
 3) Parliamentary control of the Special Criminal Courts is minimal. The
 government has complete discretion in choosing to implement Part V of the
 1939 Act allowing it to establish the Special Criminal Courts. The proclama?
 tion was issued without reference to the Oireachtas (Parliament). The govern?
 ment is not required to state reasons for the conclusion that the ordinary courts
 are inadequate. As a consequence, it is difficult to envisage the possibility of
 the Ddil (lower house) exercising its power to pass a resolution annulling such
 a proclamation, in the absence of a requirement on the government to disclose
 its reasons in the first place. There was no time limit placed on the functioning
 of the particular Special Criminal Court when established and therefore the
 Oireachtas does not have a mandatory opportunity to review the workings and
 continued need for the Court, after the lapse of a certain period of time.
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 4) Perhaps the most radical aspect of the new Court is created by Section
 40. The determination of every question before the Court, including the ver?
 dict, shall be according to the majority of the members of the bench.
 Therefore, a jury has no place in the fact-finding process of the Special
 Criminal Court, and trial by jury is no longer a constitutional right with respect
 to defendants appearing before such a Court.
 Nature of the Trial Process
 On this point, because of the detailed departures from the normal features
 of criminal court processes, I will concentrate on the situation as it exists in
 the Republic. Most of these innovations have their counterparts in the laws of
 the Province.
 1) Onus of Proof: One of the central presumptions on which the adversary
 system of criminal justice is based is that a man shall be seen as innocent until
 proven guilty. By inferring an accused's guilt from his failure to answer an
 accusation (an accusation of which he may not be aware or in a position to
 deny), the Special Criminal Courts are accepting an accusatorial conclusion.
 The defendant is not simply faced with the normal evidentiary burden in reply
 to the prosecution case, but he is forced to deny his guilt, before such a case
 is established, beyond reasonable doubt. His omission so to deny is the
 "evidence" on which the offense is founded.
 2) Right to Silence: It is a generally accepted rule of evidence that if an
 accused fails to give evidence or does not deny allegations laid against him,
 such silence cannot be construed as an admission of the case alleged by the
 state. It may not constitute a separate item of evidence and cannot amount to
 corroboration. The very worst assumption which may follow from the
 accused's silence can merely go to strengthen the inference to be drawn from
 the prosecutor's evidence.
 How, then, can such an absence of denial form evidence on which a charge
 of membership in an illegal organization will succeed?
 3) Hearsay Evidence: Perhaps the more usual way for the evidence to be
 adduced that the accused is a member of an illegal organization is by a senior
 police officer declaring his belief that this is the case. This belief may be based
 on information from another informant or from a police intelligence source.
 However the information is gathered, it may be subject to error, but because
 of its privileged status may not be tested under cross-examination.Therefore
 it is extraordinary not only that the rule against the admission of hearsay
 evidence should be ignored or abrogated, but also that such evidence should
 form the basis of the offense against the accused in a form which cannot be
 challenged by him and need not have its source divulged even to the bench.
 4) Abolition of Jury Trial: In a country where trial by jury for major
 criminal offenses is enshrined as a constitutional right,9 it is a radical departure
 to establish a tribunal, devoid of a jury, as the arbiter of fact within the criminal
 justice process.
 The justification for such a departure is that it attempts to overcome the
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 intimidation, both physical and emotional, which may be directed towards
 jurors by the agents of the accused, such as members of the organization with
 which it is alleged he is associated. Both the legislature and the judiciary had
 expressed concern that such intimidation had resulted in a reluctance on the
 part of the public to come forward with evidence in support of prosecutions
 for offenses against the state, as well as some trepidation among prospective
 jurors regarding the consequences of their being openly associated with a ver?
 dict against the accused.
 Critics of the Special Criminal Court declare that the abolition of the jury
 is an overreaction to fears of the perversion of justice caused by the intimida?
 tion of jurors; intimidation that has not been adequately established in practice.
 A more cynical justification for doing away with the jury is that the state fears
 that public empathy with the aims and motives of the accused who appear
 before the Special Criminal Courts will lead to lenient verdicts, and that the
 best way to ensure a high conviction rate is to transfer the decision regarding
 guilt into the hands of the judiciary.
 Whether one is convinced that the number of occasions a jury brings in a
 verdict which differs from the views of the judge are substantial or minimal
 in practice, the symbolic effect of removing the jury as the final arbiter of fact,
 and instead conferring this responsibility on the judiciary, is significant not
 only for public confidence in the decision-making process of the criminal trial,
 but also in the way it weakens the judiciary's postures toward impartiality and
 objectivity. No longer can the judiciary merely be seen as imposing the just
 punishment of society as a matter of course, once presented with the deter?
 mination of guilt. The judge is now implicated in setting the battle of "facts,"
 as well as seeing that the law is adhered to and reinforced.
 Non-Civilian Custody
 In the early 1970s in the North, terrorists were detained principally in
 internment camps. In fact, internment without trial became one of the cor?
 nerstones of the British antiterrorist strategy during the years in which the
 government accepted the war model. Even after the building of the Maze
 Prison, those persons imprisoned for terrorist offenses prior to the opening of
 the Maze were allowed to remain in the camps outside, under conditions very
 much comparable to those which existed for military prisoners of war in
 Europe during World War II.
 In the Republic in 1972, prisoners who were admitted members of the Pro?
 visional IRA took over the central section of Mountjoy Prison and released
 many of their fellow prisoners from the wings. Several hours later troops
 armed with riot equipment and CS gas moved into the prison to restore order.
 The following day approximately 200 prisoners were removed from riot
 damaged Mountjoy and dispersed to other penal institutions throughout the
 state, including the military detention barracks at the Curragh Military Camp,
 one of the principal army training installations in the Republic.
 The day after, two bombs exploded in a Dublin department store and a
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 travel agent's office. More devices were found in other city stores. On Tues?
 day, Mr. Lynch (the Taoiseach at the time) announced the government's inten?
 tion to strengthen the laws against illegal organizations. A step towards that
 goal was evidenced on May 23, when the Ddil passed the second stage of the
 Prisons Bill.
 Quite simply the new Act was to amend and extend earlier prison legisla?
 tion by empowering the Minister for Justice to:
 direct the transfer to military custody, of such of the persons
 aforesaid as are specified by him (Prisons Act, 1972: Section
 2(3)(b)).
 The Minister would declare the conditions for such a transfer to exist:
 if and whenever, at a time when this section is in operation, the
 Minister is of the opinion that prison accommodation or prison staff
 is insufficient to provide secure and reasonable conditions for custody
 without serious detriment to the maintenance in prison of the normal
 arrangements for the rehabilitative treatment and welfare of prisoners
 (Prisons Act, 1972: Section 2(3)).
 No reasons need be stated by the Minister for coming to this decision and
 such transfers are simply put before the Ddil without elaboration. Rarely are
 they questioned in the House.
 The wording of this subsection is made even more confusing when con?
 sidered in the light of reasons voiced in the Ddil (Vol. 261:77-360) during the
 bill's debate as to the necessity of military custody. These reasons centered on
 the emergency situation caused by the Mountjoy riot, the lack of suitable
 numbers of prison officers to staff the Curragh detention barracks as a civil
 prison, were that indeed a possible alternative, and the existence within the
 prison population of disruptive or dangerous prisoners.
 Despite the fact that the Act was represented as being an unfortunate but
 necessary response to an emergency situation, it has since been renewed on
 two occasions. In 1980, the Act was amended to continue for an additional
 three years. During the most recent debates which accompanied the second
 stage of the bill, the Minister for Justice pronounced a more elaborate justifica?
 tion for the continuing need for military custody:
 To isolate out of the civil prisons,
 (a) persons requiring a high degree of security who cannot be
 accommodated in Portlaoise prison or elsewhere in the civil prison
 system and
 (b) persons who promote or actively engage in seriously disrup?
 tive activity in civil prisons (Seanad 94:241).
 So it now seems that the military custody establishment is being used as
 an isolation unit for "known troublemakers and disrupters" (Seanad 94:241),
 in addition to the separation facilities being completed in the form of a new
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 high security prison at Portlaoise. Such facilities are in the early stages of con?
 struction, although few details have been disclosed regarding the structure and
 use of the new unit. The continued use of military custody for civil prisoners
 has been widely criticized as an "unthoughtout, uninformed, evolving situa?
 tion where, for administrative convenience and for punishment of individuals
 who are disruptive in the prison service. We have tolerated the notion of
 civilians being held in military custody" (Seanad 94:258).
 The detention of subversive or terrorist prisoners within the general jail
 population of both states is also unique, unique not only in terms of the
 physical conditions of the detention, but also because of the character and
 organization of the inmates in question.
 In the Republic almost all those inmates viewed by the government as
 "subversive" are detained in Portlaoise prison. At first view Portlaoise
 appears more like some sort of military institution rather than a civil jail. Its
 outer perimeter is secured by a substantial military presence. Inside the prison
 both police and prison officers take responsibility for maintaining order.
 Unlike the policy at the Maze prison in Belfast, the local administration
 which runs Portlaoise recognizes the paramilitary cohesion operating amongst
 the various inmate groups, and they have chosen to use this cohesion to
 facilitate communication within the jail. The apparent results of this policy are
 that in return for some de facto recognition of their political status, the
 paramilitary inmates have made available their hierarchy of discipline for con?
 flict resolution, rather than for conflict.10
 This is not the case in the North, as the years of' 'dirty protest'' and hunger
 strikes in the "H blocks" reveal. It is interesting to contrast the apparent peace
 of Portlaoise (won with few substantial concessions) with the ongoing crisis
 in the Maze. By refusing to recognize even in a de facto sense the unique status
 of the inmates in the H blocks, the government of the Province perpetuates the
 myth of criminalization with disastrous results. The regimen and conditions
 under which the paramilitary prisoners in the North are detained are unusual,
 if only in so far as the efforts made to secure their confinement. Yet in denying
 these inmates the opportunity for free association, the right to wear their own
 clothes, and to refuse to engage in prison labor (all conditions which exist in
 Portlaoise), the paramilitary cohesion has been directed towards the continued
 challenge to the state's claim to exercise a legitimate right to punish.
 Criminality as Control
 The ambiguities of "justice" so widely represented in the unique admin?
 istrative hybrids referred to above should be viewed as the inevitable products
 of the form of law which has developed in Ireland. They are not simply
 dichotomies of administration and purpose, nor are they weak points in the
 system?quite the contrary. They have been intentionally introduced into the
 criminal justice process of both states to enhance its operational strength as a
 vehicle for the repression of "politically motivated terrorism" and organized
 dissent. They serve as a crucial means by which the criminal sanction can be
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 effectively directed against what may be represented as marginal behavior.
 Rather than undermine the ideology of the justice process as a whole, they coex?
 ist with it through their very legality. As McBarnett proposes, it is the fact that
 the law institutionalizes such contradictions, that the gap between what it does
 and what it should do is managed and the law becomes all things to all men.
 To appreciate the influence of such new developments on the future
 legitimacy of the criminal sanction in Ireland, these new developments need
 to be analyzed neither as anachronisms, nor as aberrations tolerated because
 of the requirements of public peace, but rather as examples of a new form and
 substance to the law which exists in certain liberal democratic states under
 challenge. If one sees the parallel between these developments, and the recent
 use of the police by the government in the United States and more recently in
 Britain to suppress widespread urban unrest, then the structural importance of
 these changes becomes clear.
 The criticism of the criminal sanction in its role of shoring up a state under
 challenge should no longer remain on the level of the exercise of discretion.
 The analysis must be one of the law in essence rather than of the operational
 process which manifests it.
 As an example of this concern, one might choose to examine the relation?
 ship between the Special Criminal Court and military custody in the Republic.
 The Special Criminal Court and military custody were the central institutional
 creations within which the new scope of the criminal law could be given effect.
 Once the government had scheduled an offense, or the Attorney General
 declared it necessary to be heard before the Special Criminal Court, the new
 evidentiary and procedural requirements could come into play. The accep?
 tance of hearsay evidence, the additional burdens of proof placed on the
 accused, and the decline of the jury would prove fundamentally unacceptable
 to the normal criminal courts. The answer was to create a new court, the struc?
 ture of which could embrace such radical departures from established pro?
 cedure. These courts were also to deal with a new type of offender whose
 deviance ought to be represented as political as well as criminal. The institu?
 tions for imposing penal sanctions at the time could not weather the disruption
 caused by this new type of offender. Therefore a new type of sanction was pro?
 vided to remove the problem from the civil prison service.
 The stated reason for establishing the Special Criminal Court was the need
 to overcome the inadequacy of the ordinary courts to administer justice and
 effectively preserve peace. Yet this inadequacy only became apparent when
 the scope of the criminal justice process was widened to cover the more
 marginal challenge to public peace. The criminal law is never so clearly in use
 as a tool for the maintenance of public order as when it is directed to this type
 of offender. As the law swings away from its normally clearly defined role to
 determine guilt or innocence (criminal liability) and to impose penal sanctions,
 many of the safeguards for the defendant, which are built into the adversary
 process, come under strain. Therefore the necessity for the Special Criminal
 Court might equally be explained in terms of the inappropriateness of the
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 normal criminal justice process when regulating political dissent. If these pro?
 cedural safeguards are not continually to face challenge or constantly thwart
 the prosecution of such offenders, a new court with new rules must be created.
 The same explanation might be shared for the imposition of military
 custody. It removes the pressures caused by this new class of inmate. The civil
 prisons are protected and the power of the executive over the nature of the
 penal sanction is emphasized. It would be foolish, however, to consider that
 these institutional creations will not reflect on the normal working of the
 criminal justice system. Their existence is not entirely separate?it must pose
 some challenge to the continued importance accorded to the procedural
 safeguards which they discard.
 The utility of the criminal sanction as a legitimate source of control rests
 on the presumption that the radical modifications to the system through which
 it is imposed will be viewed by the community as an acceptable feature of
 proper government. The only criticism of these measures which is accepted
 as legitimate by the respective governments relates to whether or not such
 measures are justifiable in terms of the potential for success in achieving their
 objectives. However, the real question is: "Whether those modifications may
 become so 'normalized' that the original objective of relying on the ordinary
 criminal process will itself become unobtainable" (Boyle, Hay den, and
 Hillyard, 1975).
 Across Border Comparison
 Both governments in Ireland promote the criminal law as the most
 appropriate method for countering terrorism. Although the nature of organ?
 ized resistance to the two states differs considerably, the response to such
 challenges on both sides of the border is remarkably consistent. Because of
 this, one can make certain comments about the relationship between the
 criminal law, ideology, and legitimacy, as they are distorted in two quite dif?
 ferent neocolonial frameworks.
 The analysis presented in this article leaves many questions unanswered.
 For example, what are the distinguishing characteristics of the forms of
 organized resistance in both Irish states, which nonetheless have prompted the
 parallel criminalization response? In short, what great differences exist
 between the paramilitary groups on both sides of the struggle? What indeed
 do the states choose to mean by terrorism? And what distinguishes unjustified
 violence and terror from active political dissent?
 While not denying the interest and importance of particular answers to
 these questions, I have not attempted the broad social analysis from which
 these answers would arise, because it is the nature of the state's response
 which I take as my limited focus. If one accepts that the circumstances under
 which challenges are mounted to the legitimacy of both Irelands differ greatly,
 then the similarity in the major features of each state's reaction is even more
 remarkable.
 Significant results will arise for an understanding of the role of the criminal
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 sanction in the control of political dissent, from a comparative analysis of the
 two states' reactions in the control equation. While it would be enhanced by
 a detailed understanding of the different factors at work in each individual
 situation of organized violence in the Province and the Republic, such an
 analysis will not necessarily rely on a coexistent examination of the
 sociopolitical circumstances of the original challenge.
 The principal value of such a comparative analysis rests with the uniform
 response of two quite different "liberal democratic states" transmogrified by
 prolonged organized resistance to their legitimacy. The parallels of coercion
 in the two states suggest how variations in the nature of the organized
 resistance may have little effect on the state's response, provided that the
 objectives of such political dissent remain constant.
 Both states have reverted to the ideology of the criminal law for dealing
 with political violence. In so doing, they have chosen to alter drastically the
 nature of "normal" criminal sanctions and "normal" criminal law processes.
 Resort to the rhetoric of the "rule of law," in other words, is paradoxically
 belied by the adoption of special procedures which acknowledge its inade?
 quacy. Thus the torturous efforts of the state to either regain or retain
 legitimacy have fundamentally influenced the substance and the status of the
 criminal law in Ireland.
 As can be seen in the recent reactions of other states facing a crisis of
 legitimacy, there has been a noticeable movement in the process of "criminal
 justice," where exceptional forms of domination (the authority of which only
 rests on claims to legality) are preferred to more traditional democratic
 ideologies of consensus. Political challenge and organized resistance are now
 answered with repressive forms of state power. Too often these are manifested
 in the administration of the criminal sanction.
 NOTES
 1. There is a great variety of social histories of Ireland which document the influence over
 Irish society and politics since the 1600s. For a concise resume of British involvement, see Kee
 (1908).
 2. Even in cities such as Belfast and Deny today, it is economic deprivation through the
 provision of housing and employment, as well as imbalances in political representation and the
 consequent self-determination, which is the center of the social rupture.
 3. For such a criticism see Findlay and Duff (1982:253-265).
 4. It should be remembered that although certain sections of the Irish community may not
 be affected by such mystification, they may not be the object of the state's efforts in this regard.
 For example the Catholics on the Falls Road may never accept the British version of events.
 However, the government of the Province may see the British electorate and "patriots" in the
 U.S. as needing to be convinced.
 5. Balbus (1983) emphasizes this dichotomy in terms of "the dialectics of repression" within
 the bourgeois liberal state. He differs from the more structural models for analyzing criminal
 justice in that he sees the law as fundamentally determined by class conflict. He sees the
 dichotomy retained with the qualification that it is a function of the class nature of society.
 Balbus also emphasizes the risk that any liberal democratic state takes when the divergence
 between the rhetoric of legality and challenges to the rule of law becomes too obvious. He
 emphasizes the "definite constraints put forward as essential to the rule of law," over the state's
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 activities to control collective violence. Yet Balbus fails to develop the real distinction between
 the ideology of the rule of law and the structural features of its administration which run so con?
 trary to it. See also Hogg (1983).
 6. See Offenses Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1940, Section 5, and Offenses Against
 the State (Amendment) Act, 1972, Section 5.
 7. Please note the resemblance with the Prevention of Forceable Entry and Occupation Act,
 1971, Section 4 (3).
 8. These recommendations were first enacted in the Emergency Provisions (Northern Ireland)
 Act, 1973. They were later expanded upon in 1978.
 9. Article 38:
 (1) "No person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of Law."
 (5) "Save in the case of the trial of offenses under S. 2 (minor offenses), S. 3 (cases
 before special courts) or S. 4 (cases before military tribunals) of this Article no person
 shall be tried on any criminal charge without a jury."




 1973 The Dialectics of Legal Repression. New York: R?ssel Sage.
 Boyle, K., T. Hayden and P. Hillyard
 1975 Law and the State: The Case of Northern Ireland. Oxford: Martin Robinson.
 Ddil
 N.D. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 261, Ddil.
 Diplock, Lord
 1972 Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist
 Activities in Northern Ireland, Cmnd 5185, H.M.S.O.
 Findlay, M.
 1984 "Criminalization and the Detention of Political Prisoners?An Irish Solution."
 Contemporary Crises 8. New York: Elsevier Science.
 Findlay, M. and P. Duff
 1982 "The Jury in England: Practice and Ideology." International Journal of Sociology
 of Law 10.
 Habermas, J.
 1976 Legitimation Crisis. London: Heinmann.
 Hogg, R.
 1983 Perspectives on the Criminal Justice Administration. Sydney: George Allen and
 Unwin.
 Kee, R.
 1980 "Ireland, A Television History." London: BBC.
 McBarnett, D.
 1981 Conviction Law, the State, and the Constitution of Justice. London: MacMillan.
 1979 "Arrest: The Legal Context of Policing." In J. Holdway (ed.), The British Police.
 London: Edward Arnold.
 1978 "False Dichotomies in Criminal Justice Research." In J. Baldwin and A.K. Bot
 tomley (eds.), Criminal Justice. London: Martin Robertson.
 Minister of Justice
 1972 Prisons Act. London: H.M.S.O.
 Robinson, M.T.W.
 1974 The Special Criminal Court. Dublin: Trinity College Press.
 Seanad
 N.D. Parliamentary Debates, 94: Seanad.
 Skolnick, J.
 1966 Justice Without Trial. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
 Thompson, E.P.
 1977 Whigs and Hunters. London: Peregrine.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Mon, 22 May 2017 01:41:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
